
|
|
| Project | Length | Capacity | Completion |
|
a. Grissik |
Pagardewa 185 km |
350 mmscfd | 2006 |
|
b. S.Sumatra |
W.Java 764 km |
480 mmscfd | 2007 |
|
c. Kalimantan |
E.Java 1100 km |
700 mmscfd | 2010 |
|
d. E.Java |
W.Java 680 km |
350 mmscfd | 2010 |
In addition to these projects, the GOI may also
build two LNG receiving terminals in West Java, to process and
distribute gas from future LNG plants in Papua (Tangguh) and South
Sulawesi (Donggi). PGN is
also investigating the feasibility of shipping compressed natural gas
(CNG) over short to medium distances.
Show Me The Money
Many producers require financial guarantees which pose another obstacle to domestic gas growth, according to industry observers. In the power industry, a number of PSCs have requested that PLN provide standby letters of credit (SBLC) before investing in long-term gas supply agreements. These gas producers, including U.S.-owned Amerada Hess and Australian-owned Santos, want PLN to guarantee around $800 million per year through letters of credit. According to the Castle Group, a local business information firm, PLN’s credit availability with government-linked banks is only $550 million. PLN has asked Bank Indonesia to exclude SBLCs from the legal lending limit in order to get around this obstacle. (Note: some power analysts suggest that if PLN would permit higher returns on investment, companies would be willing to assume more of this risk themselves).
A recent Wood Mackenzie gas and power study concurs that financing limits growth in the domestic gas market. According to the study, most export credit agencies (ECAs) remain wary of large, domestic-oriented projects in Indonesia. Future financing will be more successful for offshore-structured, export-oriented projects that can minimize political risk and generate dollar revenues. Financing will also be more likely if companies like Pertamina, with hard currency offshore accounts, participate.
Regulations Are Still Undefined
The current uncertain regulatory environment also limits domestic gas growth, because it inhibits the exploration and development of potential gas reserves. Despite the DMO provisions in the 2001 Oil and Gas law to promote gas use, no accompanying upstream or downstream regulations have been issued to define the “rules of the game.” Nor do regulations clearly define Pertamina’s new oil and gas role. In addition to the regulatory uncertainty, doubts about contract sanctity, contract extensions, security, and taxation hurt the gas investment climate.
ExxonMobil Indonesia (EMOI) offers two examples that gas investors will watch closely. In one case, the GOI has required the company to increase gas supplies to national fertilizer projects in North Aceh, despite EMOI’s contractual commitments to supply LNG to South Korea and Japan. Moreover, EMOI must supply this gas at subsidized prices (about $1.50 per mmbtu), less than half the $3.40/mmbtu LNG price. The company is trying to complete a “value retention agreement” with the GOI in order to receive compensation for the difference in the two prices. However, the GOI has indicated that EMOI must expect to “share the pain” involved in subsidizing these fertilizer projects.
In the second case, EMOI and Pertamina have been at odds for over two years on extending the Cepu oil and gas technical assistance contract in East Java. The current contract will expire in 2010, and EMOI is ready to invest nearly $3 billion in the lucrative project, which contains at least 600 million barrels of oil and 1.7 TCF of gas. At peak production, Cepu would provide the GOI about $2 million per day in revenues and eliminate gas shortages in East Java. However, the negotiations remain stalled over the size of Pertamina’s signing bonus (it seeks $400 million) and due to the opposition of nationalist-minded senior officials who would prefer that Indonesia develop the Cepu block.
The impact of this uncertainty weighs on the government. Only eight new oil and gas contracts or extensions were signed in 2001 and two in 2002 (down from a high of 28 contracts in 1997). This year, the GOI will tender 21 new oil and gas blocks, using more favorable revenue sharing terms than in the past – in some instances, raising the PSC share for gas from 30 percent to 45 percent. So far, 13 companies (only one major) have submitted bids, for eight of those blocks. According to the American Chamber of Commerce, gas blocks signed before 1971 still account for nearly 60 percent of Indonesia’s commercial reserves. Blocks signed after 1990 account for only 14 percent of commercial reserves.
Gas Production and Use Statistics
Natural Gas Production (Million SCF)
|
Company |
2000 |
2001 |
2002 |
%Change |
|
TotalFinaElf |
841,419 |
880,237 |
835,031 |
-5.1 |
|
ExxonMobil |
458,929 |
268,109 |
558,170 |
108.2 |
|
Vico |
452,456 |
464,049 |
437,386 |
-5.7 |
|
BP |
293,034 |
294,964 |
268,410 |
-9.0 |
|
Pertamina |
285,692 |
276,791 |
257,994 |
-6.8 |
|
Conoco/Philips |
186,150 |
205,129 |
232,332 |
13.3 |
|
Unocal |
166,316 |
159,313 |
149,317 |
-6.3 |
|
CNPC |
30,901 |
45,091 |
59,015 |
30.9 |
|
Caltex |
57,753 |
50,306 |
44,825 |
-10.9 |
|
Exspan |
33,060 |
40,990 |
41,676 |
1.7 |
|
Premier/Amoseas |
12,572 |
29,238 |
40,371 |
38.1 |
|
CNOOC |
24,894 |
27,611 |
27,258 |
-1.3 |
|
Kodeco |
12,392 |
11,034 |
23,570 |
113.6 |
|
Others |
45,734 |
54,281 |
60,998 |
12.4 |
|
TOTAL |
2,901,302 |
2,807,143 |
3,036,353 |
8.2 |
Source: MIGAS
Marketed Natural Gas (Million
SCF)
|
|
2000 |
2001 |
2002 |
%Change |
|
LNG Plants |
1,588,512 |
1,489,935 |
1,656,472 |
11.2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Nat Gas Export |
- |
31,967 |
82,619 |
158.5 |
|
LPG Export |
4,148 |
2,410 |
2,474 |
2.7 |
|
Electricity |
223,564 |
195,300 |
254,237 |
23.1 |
|
Petrochemical |
255,178 |
265,701 |
230,141 |
15.5 |
|
City Gas |
62,561 |
78,389 |
82,743 |
5.6 |
|
Refinery fuel |
32,277 |
29,437 |
30,892 |
4.9 |
|
Consumer LPG |
10,788 |
10,397 |
26,611 |
155.9 |
|
Cement Plants |
2,822 |
3,420 |
2,751 |
-19.6 |
|
Others |
156,855 |
132,964 |
159,509 |
20.0 |
|
Total |
2,336,705 |
2,263,297 |
2,505,072 |
10.7 |
Source: MIGAS
Comment
Though LNG exports will remain an important component of Indonesia’s gas marketing strategy, gas demand will increasingly shift toward domestic and regional markets. Power needs and cheaper, environmentally-friendly gas will drive this shift. Short-term growth in domestic use, as evidenced by the jump in gas supply agreements, will be relatively easy. However, long-term growth will depend on more complex regulatory, legal and security improvements – the overall investment climate. A turnaround in the investment climate is essential, not only to ease financing and encourage gas development, but to improve the country’s economic health as well.
###
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